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Abstract Inspired by the success o f geographical clustering in California, many 
governments pursue cluster policy in the hope to build the next Silicon Valley. In this 
paper we critically assess the relationship between geographical clustering and 
public policy. With the help of a range o f theoretical insights and case study 
examples we show that cluster policy in fact is a risky\ venture, especially when it is 
tried to copy the success o f regional ‘best practices’. Therefore, we advice policy 
makers to move away from the Silicon Valley model and to modestly start from a 
place-specific approach of ‘Regional Realism’.
Keywords Clustering . Geography . Innovation . Public policy . Austrian economics
Introduction
All over the world, public authorities are trying to build the next Silicon Valley. At 
the moment, Silicon Valley, the nickname of Santa Clara and neighbouring counties 
in California, is possibly the world’s most famous example o f the geographical 
clustering o f economic activity (Saxenian 1994; O ’Mara 2004). For long, Santa 
Clara County and its main cities, San Jose and Palo Alto, were mostly known for 
their orchards. In 1891, however, Leland Stanford, a former California Governor and 
railroad magnate, founded Stanford University. Under the leadership o f Frederick 
Terman (1900-1982), the institution became a prominent engineering school and a 
breeding place for new, innovative companies. One o f these spin-offs was 
established in 1939 by Stanford classmates Bill Hewlett and Dave Packard, who
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developed numerous electronic devices. Ever since, the micro-electronics cluster of 
Silicon Valley has developed semiconductors and computer chips that are sold 
world-wide to component and system manufacturers.
Dazzled by this success story o f clustering, many officials have paid a ‘policy 
visit’ to the area over the years. One o f these first ‘ policy tourists’ was the Russian 
leader Khrushchev who was so impressed by what he saw that he led an attempt to 
replicate it in Akademgorodok in the middle o f Siberia. The planned ‘City of 
Science’, however, failed to produce the Silicon Valley effect the Russian president 
had hoped for (Josephson 1997). Krushschev’s attempts, however, was but one of 
several ‘Silicon Somewheres’ and ‘Tech Valleys’; that would be launched the world 
over in later years as other political leaders, from Charles de Gaulle to local mayors, 
tried to emulate the Northern California success story (Bouwman and Hulsink 2000; 
O ’Mara 2004; Stuart and Kargon 1996). In recent times, spontaneous cluster 
formation and regional high-tech clustering policy initiatives have included Silicon 
Alley (Manhattan—New York), Silicon Snowbank (Minneapolis— St.Paul-Area), 
Silicon Desert (Phoenix), Silicon Mountain (Colorado Springs), Silicon Prairie 
(Champaign-Urbana), Silicon Dominion (Virginia), Silicon Hills (Austin), Silicon 
Forest (Seattle), Silicon Fen (Cambridge), Silicon Glen (Glasgow), Silicon Bog 
(Limerick), Medicon Valley (Copenhagen), Silicon Seaside (South-Norway), Silicon 
Saxony (Sachsen), Bavaria Valley (Bayern), Silicon Polder (the Netherlands), 
Dommel Valley (Eindhoven), Silicon Kashba (Istanbul), Shalom Valley (Israel), 
Silicon Plateau (Bangalore— India), Media Valley (Inchon— South Korea), Billi— 
Can Valley (Arnhel Land—Australia) and Telecom Valley (Minas Gerais— Brazil).
Against this background, this article examines the link between successful geo- 
economic clustering on the one hand and cluster policy on the other. It asks whether 
there is a role for government in facilitating cluster formation and support and 
whether there is a difference here between high-tech and low-tech clusters. In other 
words, is it possible to build the next Silicon Valley with the help o f public policy or 
should policy makers stick to ‘old economy’-clustering? In exploring these issues we 
make use of theoretical insights and anecdotal evidence regarding clusters and 
cluster policy. The article is structured as follows. After a critique on the concept of 
clusters, we argue that, despite claims to the contrary, cluster policy remains a form 
of industrial policy that implies a form of targeting. We then discuss the general 
pitfalls o f cluster policy as well as the risks associated with policy towards high-tech 
and low-tech clusters. Given the fact that governments always want to facilitate 
clustering anyway, we present case examples of successful clusters in which 
government played no or only a limited role, e.g. in the field of cluster marketing. 
Without exception, these examples show how important it is to take into account the 
particularities and realities o f an area. The article concludes by suggesting that policy 
makers should move away from strategy aimed at trendy ‘Silicon Somewheres’ 
towards a no-nonsense approach o f ‘Regional Realism’.
Geographical clustering and public policy: general criticism
Harvard University Professor Michael Porter (2000a, p. 254), one o f the leading 
advocates o f cluster policy, defines a cluster as “... a geographically proximate group
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of interconnected companies and associated institutions in a particular field, linked 
by commonalities and complementarities”. Clusters are thus made up of various 
parties, ranging from specialized suppliers, service providers and firms in related 
industries, to universities, standards agencies and trade associations, while their 
geographical concentration is said to facilitate the movement o f ideas and people 
between them, in the process promoting and reinforcing innovative behavior.
Clusters: a fuzzy concept
In spite o f a neat definition, it is difficult to trace and fix clusters in practice as all 
industries ultimately depend on each other. As a matter of fact, a cluster is often in 
the eye o f the policy maker or adviser. For example, in Porter’s framework the 
geographic scope o f a cluster can range from a region, a state, or even a single city to 
span nearby or neighboring countries. The elasticity o f the concept therefore makes 
it difficult to determine where a cluster begins or ends. As the cluster guru Porter 
puts it: “The geographic scope o f a cluster relates to the distance over which 
informational, transactional, incentive, and other efficiencies occur... Drawing cluster 
boundaries is often a matter o f degree and involves a creative process informed by 
understanding the linkages and complementarities across industries and institutions 
that are most important to competition in a particular field” (Porter 2000b, pp. 16-17). 
According to Porter, the United States disposes of 60 clusters, whereas the OECD has 
identified more than 300 of them (Martin and Sunley 2003). At one extreme, the term 
refers to national groups o f industries and firms that are strongly linked, but dispersed 
over several different locations within a country. At the other, clusters are identified as 
local groupings o f similar firms in related industries within a highly spatially 
circumscribed area. In between, clusters have come to encompass even such entities as 
the K-12 Minnesota public school system (Rosenfeld 2001).
Martin and Sunley (2003) point out that the main explanation for this conceptual 
confusion is that clusters are constructs with essentially no self-defining boundaries, 
whether in terms o f inter-sectoral, inter-firm linkages, information networks and 
geographical reach. Because of their elusive character, clusters are ideally suited for 
various political agendas. As Norton (1999, non-paginated) puts it: “To skeptics, 
cluster theory sometimes looks like a vehicle for state and local government officials 
in search o f a targeting rationale.” Martin and Sunley (2003) further add to that most 
cluster policies do not identify working clusters, but rely instead on more 
immediately and statistically visible industrial sectors, which rarely conform to 
clusters. In practical terms, policy makers are typically under pressure to find 
clusters in as many areas—be it countries, regions or cities—as possible for fear of 
offending some o f their voters’ interests. While in theory Porter’s clusters are not 
necessarily economically highly specialized entities (industries), in reality virtually 
all identified clusters are defined in such a narrow way.
Practical considerations also explain the inherent ‘fuzziness’ of cluster bound­
aries. While concentrations o f economic activity mostly result from spontaneous 
results o f market processes, the different capital requirements o f various industries 
have resulted in widely different geographical scales, ranging from the regional to 
the street level. Furthermore, cities have their basis in a unique human trait, the 
propensity, as Adam Smith (1776 [1976], p. 25) famously wrote, to “truck, barter
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and exchange one thing for another” which in turn leads to an ever increasing and 
geographically dispersed division o f labour. As a consequence o f this human 
propensity to exchange, cities have never been predominantly closed or self­
sufficient systems, but rather nodal points o f trade where individuals belonging to 
various firms and networks interact on different geographical scales. The result is 
that even in highly advanced cluster-based economies such as Silicon Valley, outside 
buyers and suppliers are typically deemed more important by local firms than their 
surrounding neighbors (Desrochers 2000).
Finally, the identification o f  clusters is hampered by the lack o f trustworthy 
statistical material in this field. Because o f limited data availability, clusters are 
often reduced to industries that can be traced to national industrial classification 
systems. In practice, however, clusters rarely conform to sectors. If, instead, parts 
o f a cluster are put under different traditional industrial or service categories, the 
problem arises that significant clusters might be obscured or unrecognized. On top 
o f this, industrial classification schemes are themselves highly problematic. 
Indeed, as the economic Zvi Griliches (1990) once noted, economic ‘sectors’ as 
defined by government statisticians may be nothing more than a ‘mirage’. Among 
other problems is the fact that industrial classifications hide the multi-product 
nature o f many firms and the very different expertise o f their employees. 
Furthermore, even standard industry boundaries are typically arbitrary. For 
example, the old American Standard Industrial Classification System used both 
‘product’ and ‘production process’ criteria to delineate various categories, while 
ignoring important industries like plastics and electronics as distinct categories 
(Desrochers 2001).
The need to target in cluster policy
Cluster policy refers to all those efforts o f government to develop and support 
clusters in a particular area. It is often regarded as more modest in its ambitions 
than traditional industrial policy which was aimed “at particular industries (and 
the firms as their components) to achieve the outcomes that are perceived by 
the state to be efficient for the economy as a whole” (Chang 1994, p. 60). The 
instruments that are used to influence an industry’s behavior include import tariffs, 
subsidies to declining or emerging sectors as well as public schemes promoting R 
and D-investments. Porter (2000a, p. 27) argues that “the intellectual foundations 
o f cluster theory and industrial policy are fundamentally different, as are their 
implications for government policy”. To him, cluster policy is more general in 
focus and support mechanisms than traditional industrial policy. In essence, Porter 
(2000a) sees his approach as a framework geared towards the ‘competitiveness’ o f 
a given country or region. His reasoning is that areas with industries that are 
embedded in wide and deep clusters are more competitive than other places. The 
concept o f ‘competitiveness’ refers to the quality o f an area’s business environment 
and as such to framework conditions, like the availability o f natural resources, 
skilled labour and especially the presence o f strong clusters. In this respect, cluster 
policy should be aimed at “removing obstacles, relaxing constraints, and 
eliminating inefficiencies that impede productivity and innovation in the cluster” 
(Porter 2000a, p. 26).
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Ideally, governments pursuing cluster policy should shift their attention from 
targeting and subsidizing particular industries towards facilitating the development 
and functioning o f clusters in the economy. In the literature, this desired change in 
policy orientation has been described as a move away from specific to generic 
policy, a transition from direct to indirect intervention and a shift from vertical to 
horizontal policy (see e.g. Chang 1994 and McDonald and Dearden 2005). Cluster 
policy can be seen as part o f a new ‘heterodox’ economic policy framework in 
which significant dimensions of economic policy at large are being reformulated in 
terms o f area-based framework policy (Storper and Scott 1995). In practice, 
however, cluster policy is hard to isolate from other economic policy approaches. 
Meanwhile, cluster-based initiatives can be found under several headings in policy 
documents and statistics, such as industrial policy, innovation policy and regional 
development policy. At Ministries o f Economic Affairs, for example, departments 
that were in charge for industrial policy mostly have become responsible for cluster 
policy, while regional development agencies have transformed regional network 
programmes into cluster initiatives (Rosenfeld 2001).
At first sight, framework policy supporting clusters for competitiveness seems to 
be indeed more generic and market-friendly than more interventionistic past 
approaches such as state aid to ‘national champions’ or ‘picking the winner’ 
strategies (Chang 1994). Upon reflection, however, cluster policy implies a form of 
targeting as well. Firstly, there is a great deal o f selectivity ingrained in the concept 
o f ‘competitiveness’ (Reinert 1995). To raise an area’s competitive advantage vis-à- 
vis other areas, government officials still have to decide which economic activities 
should be supported and which ones should be left to face market forces. Secondly, 
even if  the goals o f cluster policy are generic, the tools used to achieve these goals 
often implicitly favour certain activities. Public investments in an area’s science base 
or R and D-subsidies simply cannot benefit all clusters, but will always be biased 
towards particular parts o f the economy (Cowling et al. 1999). For example, a 
biotechnology cluster is more likely to make use of innovation-oriented policy 
schemes than a cluster o f the ‘old’ economy (e.g. coal production) where 
opportunities for radical renewal are less obvious. Public authorities can therefore 
not escape from targeting strategies, whether they operate in a cluster-based 
framework or not.
All in all, Porter’s attempt to differentiate cluster policy from industrial policy is 
not convincing. Because cluster theory and industrial policy have similar problems 
o f selection and implementation, it is hard to maintain that the two policy 
philosophies are fundamentally different. Porter seems to have made a fine 
distinction, but in practice cluster strategy does amount to picking winners or 
backing losers (Norton 1999, non-paginated) and does constitute a radical break 
from past practices. Indeed policy makers are making clear choices when devising 
cluster policy: they pursue either an offensive type o f policy aimed at stimulating 
high-technology clusters (e.g. information-, bio-and nanotechnology) or a defensive 
type o f cluster policy addressed at preserving traditional activities (for example, 
textiles, automotive and machinery). In short, their goal is the development of either 
a Silicon Somewhere or a Rising Rustbelt (Hospers 2004a). We will see that such 
targeting has a long and unsuccessful history. Therefore, policy makers in charge for 
cluster policy should take care not to make the same mistakes as before.
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The pitfalls of public policy towards geographical clustering
In practice, clusters are often reduced to industries and treated as such by 
policymakers. Moreover, we saw that cluster policy is about targeting and therefore 
involves issues reminiscent o f industrial policy. This section dwells on the pitfalls of 
cluster policy. To start, we focus on the general difficulties regarding public 
targeting. Thereafter we have a look at the special problems that emerge in targeting 
high-tech clusters on the one hand and low-tech clusters on the other.
Targeting and information asymmetries
Given the fact that government cannot support every cluster in a similar manner, it 
has to choose which clusters get special attention and which not. In grounding the 
choice for particular clusters, policy makers mostly make use o f economic-scientific 
arguments. These arguments, however, may be criticized; often they are not 
scientific at all, but rather political, while ignoring economic warnings and historical 
evidence against targeting. With regard to the alleged academic grounding o f cluster 
policy Buss (1999, p. 343) argues that typically “targeted industry studies use poor 
or inappropriate data, deeply flawed social science methods, and simplistic 
mathematical models in producing targets. Targets themselves tend to be dubious”. 
As Buss sees it, targeting strategies, including cluster-based targeting, are not 
practiced because o f their scientific merit, but because of their appeal to certain 
political constituencies. Impressive analytics (e.g. cluster studies carried out by 
Porter and his team) can be produced on demand to justify inherently political 
proposals and— as they have the appearance of scientific backing—quickly generate 
a ‘herd effect’ among policy advisers. Once policy makers in some regions or 
localities develop targeting strategies, others feel compelled to follow suit.
The economist Joseph Schumpeter emphasized early on the intimate relationship 
between politics and policy. “Nobody has attained political maturity who does not 
understand that policy is politics. Economists are particularly apt to overlook these 
truths” (Schumpeter 1950, p. 8). In addition to Schumpeter’s cynical view, there are 
also sound economic-scientific reasons that teach us that policy-makers are not in a 
better position than market actors for ‘cluster picking’. As public choice theory 
makes clear, ‘government failure’ is as common as ‘market failure’ owing to massive 
information asymmetries and strategic behavior by politicians and bureaucrats (Wolf 
1990). Among other problems, governments officials typically have little under­
standing of the dynamics o f business life and are too removed from the workplace to 
identify real opportunity areas. After all, there is a inherent and fundamental 
difference between the public sphere (politics) and private sphere (commerce). Since 
both arenas have their own moral foundations and constitute different ‘ systems of 
survival’, interference by one in the other system generally should be avoided as 
much as possible (Jacobs 1992).
Especially in issues around clustering large information asymmetries between 
entrepreneurs and policy makers are likely to occur. This has to do with the ‘tacit’ 
character o f spatial clustering. As a matter of fact, geographical agglomeration is 
closely related to the generation and transmission o f tacit knowledge based in 
“particular circumstances o f time and place” (Hayek 1948). In a cluster, the crucial
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knowledge is not so much knowledge that is explicit, formalized and easily to 
communicate, but rather non-standardized knowledge that is embodied in human 
capital and acquired through experience. This knowledge can hardly be specified; in 
essence, it can only be bought and sold through the transfer of individuals. It is the 
sum of experience that firms in a cluster buy when they hire individuals who have 
‘been around’ for a long time. It is knowledge that only individuals who have been 
working in the same industry or firm for a certain amount o f time possess. This 
‘tacit’ character o f clustering helps to explain the particular ‘industrial atmosphere’ 
that Marshall ( 1890 [1947], p. 225) already noticed in success stories o f clustering of 
his time, like the ‘industrial district’ around Sheffield. In such places, Marshall notes, 
one can feel something ‘in the air’ producing the effect hat “if  one man starts a new 
idea, it is taken up by others and combined with suggestions o f their own; and thus it 
becomes the source of further new ideas”.
In this respect, MacDonald (1992) argues that government officials are not well 
placed to deal with the flows o f tacit knowledge that make the richness o f prosperous 
clusters. They miss the know-how, know-who and experience of the participants in 
the clusters they address. One cannot predict in advance which policy measures will 
be needed in cluster, as the activities in a cluster that demand certain support cannot 
be determined beforehand; these demands depend on the particular circumstances of 
time and place. Moreover, in most cases, policy won’t even touch the knowledge 
about the reality o f the current marketplace, as well as knowledge about a potential 
future state o f the market. As illustrated by the genesis o f the micro-electronics 
cluster in Silicon Valley, the birth, life and death o f clusters is essentially part o f a 
spontaneous order that rests on entrepreneurial discovery and the generation of 
explicit and tacit knowledge. To be sure, clusters are important to economic 
performance. However, officials should realize that they often will form spontane­
ously and that the role o f (local) tacit knowledge in their development is 
fundamental. Predicting which activities are going to produce clusters the future 
is not possible. In the end, clustering is the result o f entrepreneurial activity and is 
driven by the production o f goods and services to seize profits. Government cannot 
simply supersede the market in the creation o f those clusters (Sautet 2002b).
Picking winners: trendy high-tech clusters
Inspired by the Silicon Valley-phenomenon most governments tend to focus on high­
tech clusters in their attempts to raise competitiveness. In general, high-tech 
activities like information and communication technology (ICT), biotechnology and 
nanotechnology is considered to be exciting and modern and therefore worth to 
stimulate (Drucker 1985). High-tech cluster policy, however, involves at least three 
dangers.
First, as we discussed in detail above, there are no fundamental reasons to believe 
why policy makers are better informed than entrepreneurs in assessing the future 
economic potential o f particular ventures (including clusters). Due to the inherent 
uncertain character o f new technologies such government failure is likely to occur 
especially when it comes to high-tech clustering. As Schmookler (1966, p. 199) 
argues, almost all instances of innovative activities that he studied were not 
stimulated by policy-pushed scientific research but by the realization that a costly
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problem had to be solved or that a profit opportunity could be seized. According to 
Miller and Côté (1985), this is one o f the main reasons why ‘innovation centers’ and 
other greenhouses in innovation parks opened in the USA and Canada in the 1970s 
and 1980s have failed without exception. Also French high-tech policy in the 1980s 
shows the risks of a strategy of picking winners. After five years of subsidizing the 
micro-electronics sector the French had to admit that they backed the wrong horse. 
One of the reasons why French high-tech policy failed was the lack of commercial 
insight among the public elites whose only aim was to make France world-leading in 
micro-electronics. For a more recent case of public ignorance on technological 
development, think of the world-wide hype around information technology: to be 
sure, the impact of this technology is important, but it certainly has not led to the 
‘new economy’ the authorities hoped for (Clarke 2001).
Further, the possibility for areas to reap profits from high-tech clusters may be 
limited—and not only because high-tech normally offers far less employment than 
low-tech or no-tech sectors (Drucker 1985). More important than this job-argument 
is the fact that in the global innovation race most areas target similar activities. 
Usually, public authorities want to run each other close, the consequence being that 
nearly all o f them support the development of information-, bio- and nanotechnology 
clusters. All over Europe it is tried to create ‘Silicon Somewheres’ now (see the 
introduction for a list of examples). As suggested in the literature on industrial 
organization, however, real competitive advantage does come from making a 
difference, not from copying rivals (Martin 2001). By mirroring themselves with 
Silicon Valley, areas do not make clear how they differ from one another; in fact, 
they only strengthen the ‘first mover advantage’ of the Californian high-tech hub. 
Apart from that, from a supranational (e.g. European or North-American) 
perspective the current bandwagon effect in high-tech cluster policy fosters 
excessive investment (duplication) in the same technologies. This herd behaviour 
may lead to overcapacity, bubbles and ultimately a crash in which only the fittest 
actors survive (Lux 1995). Likewise, by investing in similar technologies and 
copying ‘best practices’, areas undermine their potential competitive advantage and 
should not be surprised that in the end a painful shake-out will occur.
Finally, in supporting high-tech clusters authorities often ignore the question 
whether the preconditions for such clusters are present in an area. Differences in 
starting-position, economic structure and institutional particularities are important. 
Evolutionary economists have shown that innovation often derives from chance 
events or a unique socio-economic setting (Witt 1993). Thus, what works in one area 
is not necessarily suitable or feasible for another territory. A location, for example, is 
unlikely to be successful in high-tech clustering without having enough ‘absorptive 
capacity’ for new technologies (Cooke 2002). If a place lacks such a ‘receiving 
system’, cluster policy may be risky. Castells and Hall (1994) provide compelling 
evidence that the costs of starting clusters from scratch are very high and that it may 
take at best a long time before clusters are embedded. An example of policy failure 
in high-tech clustering is Akademgorodok in Russia. After the model of Silicon 
Valley this Siberian ‘city of science’ was built ‘ex nihilo’ in the 1950s. Since then, 
the place has been languishing for decades. Other cases pointing to the importance 
of embeddedness in clustering come from Southern-Italy and the Ruhr Area 
(Hospers 2004a). Here, ambitious policy initiatives in the 1960s and 1970s were
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simply rejected by the environment. Both the industrial complexes in Sardinia and 
the high-tech sectors in the Ruhr Area turned out to be disembodied and ended as 
‘cathedrals in the desert’.
Backing losers: traditional low-tech clusters
It is not only high-tech activities that policy makers support in their cluster policies. 
Many states and localities are stuck with the heritage o f the ‘old economy’ of a low- 
tech or no-tech character (Hayter 1997). Due to fierce competition and declining 
demand notably old industrial areas specialized in textiles, coal and steel making, ship 
building, food processing and car production have come into difficulties. Although 
these ‘national champions’ often have undergone a restructuring process over the last 
decades, most o f them still obtain aid under the heading of cluster or regional policy 
(Todtling and Trippl 2004). Is such a low-tech cluster policy a viable alternative to the 
current trend among policy makers to build their own ‘Silicon Somewheres’?
In contrast to many high-tech activities these clusters are at least embedded in their 
environment and usually employ a large number o f people (Fingleton 1999). In terms 
of the popular field o f ‘new economic geography’, one might say that the increasing 
returns to scale in these traditional industrial activities have laid the foundation for 
long-term comparative advantage (Puga 2002). Thus, these clusters have had the 
chance to prove their viability for the economy. Examples are coal and steel in 
Wallonia (Belgium), forestry in Scandinavia and Canada, automotive in Southern- 
Germany, watch making in the Arc Jurassien (Switzerland), textiles in Northern-Italy, 
snowclearing equipment in Finland, irrigation machinery in Israel and wine making in 
California. However, the way in which officials mostly support such clusters is subject 
to criticism. In fact, the authorities run the risk o f ‘backing losers’.
For one thing, public policies aimed at low-tech clusters frequently pursue a 
divergent mixture o f goals, which immediately precludes an optimal policy response. 
Political desires to keep ‘national champions’ alive are often hazily mixed with 
objectives o f restructuring, employment issues and national industrial policy 
considerations. Authors working in ‘policy studies’ continue to emphasize that 
having such multiple objectives for one policy are highly dangerous, as they may 
conflict and thus rule out the possibility for a clear-cut strategy (Dunn 2003). In fact, 
we are dealing here with Tinbergen’s famous principle o f the ‘equality of 
instruments and targets’ : it is impossible to reach different economic goals (e.g. 
full employment and sustainable economic growth) with one general instrument. 
Instead, the attainment o f every objective requires the use of a specific instrument 
(Tinbergen 1952). Dutch policy towards shipbuilding from the 1970s until today is a 
dramatic case in which this principle has been overlooked. Time after time sound 
economic reasons to shrink Dutch shipyards have been overridden by short-term 
employment thinking, a desire to continue the Dutch maritime pride and 
employment aims, e.g. in the north o f the Netherlands (Groningen, Friesland). 
Since the 1970s, English policy makers have made similar mistakes in automotive 
manufacturing. The simultaneous pursuing o f social, restructuring, nationalistic and 
economic goals did not work and may explain the decline o f car production in the 
UK—varying from the bankruptcy o f British Leyland in the past to the case of 
Rover recently.
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For another thing, the set-up o f most low-tech cluster policies does not cure the 
underlying problems o f the activities targeted. These programmes often consist of 
subsidy schemes for industrial firms that have come into financial difficulties. In 
theory, old industrial clusters may be supported temporarily to be able to revitalise 
(Todtling and Trippl 2004). The problem is that starting subsidies is easier than 
stopping them. Even worse, there is a possibility o f ‘subsidy addiction’ in that areas 
become fully dependent on public support (Howitt 1996). After all, subsidy-based 
policy measures in traditional sectors often do not help firms to restructure, but 
instead contribute to the maintenance o f inefficiencies accumulated in the past. The 
institutional school in economic geography argues that especially old industrial 
regions are likely to fall in this inefficient subsidy-trap (Fuchs and Shapira 2005). 
That has to do with the phenomenon o f ‘lock-in’ and the ‘not-invented-here 
syndrome’, i.e. the tendency o f formerly successful areas to stick to existing patterns 
rather than to pace up with changing economic circumstances. Typical cases are 
Wallonia and the Ruhr Area since the 1960s. For a long time, close local networks of 
industrialists and politicians maintained the employment in coal and steel artificially 
and thus delayed the reorientation o f the region into new activities. In short, low-tech 
cluster policy may frustrate the restructuring process needed for adjusting production 
to consumer’s demand. Consequently, the connection o f the region with new market 
developments may be missed.
If you can’t help, please do not harm
So far, we have criticized cluster policy by arguing that in fact it amounts to 
industrial policy with the associated risks. But while one may acknowledge that 
governments are limited in their capacity to establish a successful industrial policy, 
one may still see a role for governments, which is to facilita te  cluster emergence as 
opposed to design it. The issue o f facilitation is not new in policy, but it has gained 
more prominence in recent times, especially in Anglosaxon countries. Industry New 
Zealand, the UK Department o f Trade and Industry and Industry Canada, for 
example, see the facilitation of clusters as a core governmental role that is akin to, 
say, infrastructure development. Is this a suitable method to avoid the risks of 
picking winners and backing losers?
In practice, government facilitation o f clusters may have the same effect as more 
interventionist types o f cluster policy. After all, similar problems regarding 
knowledge and incentives may emerge. The Austrian economist Kirzner has often 
stressed the idea that the main peril o f public policy (in his terminology: regulation) 
is the stifling of the entrepreneurial discovery process. He sees four main reasons 
why this is the case (Kirzner 1979):
1. Regulator’s ignorance o f the counter factual,
2. The impossibility for regulators to discover opportunities for coordination 
improvements in the absence o f a profit motive,
3. The potentially stifling impact o f regulation on the discovery process and
4. The likelihood that regulation may propel the market in a direction which is not 
desired by consumers (Kirzner 1979; Sautet 2002a).
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By stifling the entrepreneurial process, regulation reduces the capacity o f the 
market to generate knowledge that could otherwise improve the coordination of 
individuals’ plans. In other words, the fundamental problem o f market-oriented 
public policies (including market facilitation) is that it reduces the coordinative 
properties o f the market system.
As we stressed before, policies that promote clustering often amount to picking 
winners or backing losers. This is because governments cannot generate the 
knowledge that would be required to make most clusters work. There is no reason to 
think that under the institutional arrangements where governments take an active role 
in cluster promotion, the relevant knowledge will be generated. Thus, even if 
governments were composed of individuals who had only the public welfare in 
mind, they would still not be able to implement successful cluster policies. The 
limits of governmental active policies are not so much in the nature of men, but in 
the knowledge that is required to implement these policies (Sautet 2002b). Seen 
from this perspective, government facilitation o f clustering is just a variation on the 
theme of industrial policy. It is a way o f promoting government intervention, while 
feigning to be non-interventionist. This is because facilitation policy may have the 
form of, again, a subsidy scheme that is inherently biased and moreover is not 
required. After all, if  it facilitates clusters that would have succeeded anyway, it is 
not needed. Alternatively, if  it facilitates firms that would have otherwise failed, it 
interferes with the selective process o f the market—thus subsidizing what would not 
have come into existence in the first place.
Government facilitation o f clusters may fall into the traps associated with picking 
winners or backing losers. At any given time in any place, there is a limited amount 
of resources available. Therefore, agencies that do the facilitating still have to select 
which clusters are being helped and which not. Since there is no reason to think, as 
Kirzner (1979) argues, that governments face the incentives and possess the 
knowledge that would help them succeed in their selection process, facilitation does 
not differ from any other type o f cluster policy. It is only through the trial and error 
process o f the market that the best industrial structure emerges at one given point in 
time and space. Fundamentally governments should make sure not to interfere with 
the coordinative properties o f the market and not to limit the ways in which change 
is taking place. The life and death o f cities, industries and regions is inevitable in a 
‘living economy’ (to use Mises’s words), governments should not slow this process 
down. This fact of life is a warning for policy makers in general and cluster policy 
officials in particular. Or, to put it in the famous words of Hippocrates (Epidemia I): 
“If you can’t help, please do not harm” (cited in Salacuse, 1994).
What role, if  any, for government?
If both interventionist and facilitation cluster policy are risky, is there any role left 
then for cluster policy? To answer this question, we take a quick look at the 
emergence o f some examples o f successful clustering and the way government has 
contributed to that success. Table 1 lists a few ‘success stories’ from Europe (see 
Hospers 2004b for more illustrations). As the table shows, in some places traditional 
industrial crafts have been rejuvenated by fostering the introduction of high-
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Table 1 European examples of successful clustering by combining trends and traditions
European région Local tradition Global trend New combination
Arc Jurassien
Emilia-Romagna
Baden-Württemberg
Jutland
Manchester
North-Pas-de-Calais
Ruhr Area
Dunakanyar
Krakow Region
Watch making 
Textiles industry 
Machine tools 
Furniture 
Heavy industries 
Clothing sector 
Heavy industries 
Bathing culture 
Building and painting
Marketing and lifestyle 
High-tech production 
Growing digitalisation 
Quality and lifestyle 
Pop music/pop art 
Need for convenience 
Experience economy 
Ageing and wellness 
Need for maintenance
Swatch watches 
Trendy fashion 
Multimedia devices 
Design furniture 
Cultural industries 
Mail order services 
Industrial culture 
Health resorts 
Restoration services
technology in design, production and marketing. With such a strategy ‘new 
combinations’ have been realised in Swiss watch making, Italian textiles and Danish 
furniture. Other cases show how the expertise o f a declining sector may be exploited 
for emerging trends. The pop music and art cluster in Manchester (UK) and the 
multimedia cluster in Baden-Württemberg (Germany) can be traced back to the prior 
existence o f industries whose know-how on advanced materials proved to be useful 
for the new businesses. Other areas have taken advantage o f the trend that demand 
for consumer services is rising. In North-Pas-de-Calais (France) several textile 
factories have been transformed into mail order firms specialized in clothing, while 
in the Ruhr Area (Germany) former mines and steel factories are used for touristic 
purposes (‘industrial culture’). Relevant examples o f such ‘trend through tradition’ 
in Central and Eastern Europe are modern health resorts around Hungarian spas and 
high-tech restoration services in the Polish building cluster.
In an attempt to explain the strong performance of these clusters, three points 
stand out. In the first place, the examples suggest that successful clusters almost 
always have their basis present economic structure. The centuries-old tradition of 
watchmaking in Switzerland, coal and steel in the Ruhr Area and spas in Hungaria, 
to highlight just a few examples, have laid the fundamentals for modern clusters in 
these areas. Apparently, where areas are going to, still depends upon where they are 
coming from (Hassink 1997). Even if  it may be a trivial statement, the economic 
perspectives o f an area cannot be but somehow connected to its past. Thus, these 
examples are not ‘best practices’ but rather ‘unique practices’, demonstrating only 
that it is always an area’s uniqueness that counts for regional competitiveness. In the 
second place, unlike an approach of ‘ backing losers’, building on the past only 
makes sense when a cluster’s traditions are connected to global trends. In fact, 
successful clusters are always—to paraphrase Schumpeter’s (1912) term for 
innovations— ‘new combinations’ o f local traditions and global trends. As the table 
shows, such global-local interfaces with opportunities for growth may come from 
joining existing economic activities in an area, upgrading traditional industries for 
the new economy or making use o f old industrial knowledges for novel purposes as 
dictated by economy-wide, structural developments. In the third place, it is striking 
to see how little government has contributed to the success of the clusters. All o f the 
clusters have emerged spontaneously, and when government did play a role in a 
cluster, it was only in the period after its emergence.
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Let us take a look at the government role in the clusters reviewed in the table 
(Hospers 2004b). In some areas public authorities have been largely absent in the 
clustering process. This was the case in Manchester, North-Pas-de-Calais, 
Dunakanyar and the Krakow Region. To be sure, the governments o f these regions 
brand their areas now for touristic and business purposes by highlighting their strong 
regional clusters—but only after the clusters emerged spontaneously. In Emilia- 
Romagna, Baden-Württemberg and Jutland and the government has enabled the 
creation of business support and technology transfer centres providing ‘real services’ 
(e.g. technological advice and networking events) to the clusters. The government 
did not interfere in the cluster, but only offered information and contacts on demand 
of the business community. Admittedly, this may be seen as a type o f ‘facilitation 
policy’, but because o f its concrete, non-interventionistic and ex-post character 
public involvement in fact has been harmless. In other places government has 
entered the scene predominantly in the marketing o f the cluster. In the Jura d ’Arc, 
Baden-Württemberg and the Ruhr Area, it was the local business community that 
decided to join forces and develop clusters in the field o f watchmaking (Swatch), 
industrial culture respectively multimedia technology. When the resulting clusters 
turned out to be a success, the government joined in and took care of the marketing 
(branding) of the clustering in the outside world. Thus, the regions have been 
promoted as ‘places to be’ for parties (investors, tourists) interested in the activities 
of the clusters. This public ‘cluster marketing’ does not really harm the market 
process as long as its aim is to attract the attention o f new investors or clients 
contributing to the continuation o f its performance (Kotler et al. 1993; Rainisto 
2003). The motto ‘be good and tell it’ also applies to clusters: cluster parties 
themselves should take care for being good, while government may advertize the 
success o f clusters that have passed the market-test.
Conclusion: towards an approach of ‘regional realism’
Inspired by the clustering success o f Silicon Valley, many governments pursue 
cluster policy in the hope to build their own ‘Silicon Somewheres’. Cluster policy is 
widely regarded as a strategy that is less pretentious than traditional, more selective 
economic policies. If we may believe Porter (2000a), cluster policy is—unlike 
industrial policy—a horizontal and market-friendly approach. In this article we have 
criticized this view on several grounds. For a start, due to the fuzziness o f the cluster 
concept clusters are often reduced to industries and treated as such by public 
authorities. Furthermore, cluster policy is (like traditional industrial policy) a matter 
of targeting: policy makers have to decide which clusters to help and which not. In 
general, this is a risky venture because of large information asymmetries between 
entrepreneurs and policy makers. Particular problems emerge when it comes to high­
tech cluster policy and low-tech cluster policy. The first strategy resembles an 
industrial policy o f ‘picking winners’ with the associated traps, while the other 
approach reminds us o f a risky policy o f ‘backing losers’.
Although a public policy o f ‘facilitating clusters’ may sound preferable and more 
desirable, we have argued that government still faces a knowledge problem about 
market processes. Therefore, the best motto for officials in charge for cluster policy
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is perhaps: “If you can’t help, please do not harm”. Indeed, examples o f successful 
clustering reveal how little government can contribute to a cluster’s performance. In 
fact, we only see a potential role for public authorities ex-post: they may brand the 
success o f clusters after they have have emerged spontaneously in the market. In 
carrying out this ‘ cluster marketing’ it is important to take into account and promote 
the particularities and realities o f an area. After all, competition is not about copying, 
but about making a difference. Obviously, this is something different than trying to 
build the next ‘Silicon Somewhere’. If  governments want to have a policy aimed at 
clustering, they must apply a ‘do-not-harm’ approach. This does not leave much 
policy choice; in fact, facilitation and tax reduction (along with simplification o f the 
regulatory burden for start-ups) may suffice. Therefore, governments that are 
inspired by the cluster concept should be modest and start from ‘Regional Realism’ 
rather than to try to build the next Silicon Valley.
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